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Audit log
Every action — by users + API keys + system. 4-year retention per § 395.22(i).
16 of 16
| When (UTC) | Actor | Type | Action | Resource | IP | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-19 01:42:13 | Daniil Shevchuk | USR | Reviewed anomaly: unidentified driving on Unit 105 | anom_001 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-19 01:18:02 | Marina Volkova | USR | Approved log edit proposal | drv_004 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-19 00:54:48 | TMS sync (Apex) | API | GET /v1/carrier/vehicles | — | 52.42.13.7 | OK |
| 2026-05-19 00:54:47 | TMS sync (Apex) | API | GET /v1/carrier/drivers | — | 52.42.13.7 | OK |
| 2026-05-19 00:11:03 | Roman Levchenko | USR | Sent message to driver Andriy Pavlenko | drv_001 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 23:42:17 | Marina Volkova | USR | Generated FMCSA Output File for Pavlo Shevchenko (8d) | drv_004 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 22:01:55 | Daniil Shevchuk | USR | Invited [email protected] as Viewer | usr_006 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 20:18:09 | Igor Markov | USR | Resolved fault SPN 100 FMI 1 on Unit 103 | veh_103 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 18:46:30 | Accounting export | API | GET /v1/carrier/detention | — | 98.7.40.22 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 17:33:11 | Daniil Shevchuk | USR | Submitted detention claim LD-14228 to TQL | det_001 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 15:09:42 | Anna Petrova | USR | Attempted to edit driver log (denied — view-only) | drv_002 | 73.20.114.8 | DENIED |
| 2026-05-18 14:47:23 | Daniil Shevchuk | USR | Created API key 'TMS sync (Apex)' (3 scopes) | key_001 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 12:30:01 | Roman Levchenko | USR | Added driver: Carlos Mendoza | drv_003 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 11:18:55 | Daniil Shevchuk | USR | Updated HOS policy: PC max miles 50 → 75 | — | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 09:44:12 | Marina Volkova | USR | Dismissed anomaly: instant_certify on Volkov | anom_004 | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
| 2026-05-18 08:02:30 | Daniil Shevchuk | USR | Sign-in via passkey from Mac | — | 73.20.114.8 | OK |
Tamper-evident: Each event references the cryptographic hash of the previous event, forming a Merkle chain. Daily roots are anchored to a public attestation log. Any retroactive edit invalidates downstream hashes and is flagged immediately. Required for SOC 2, ISO 27001, and DOT audit defense.